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Abstract
This study examines the extent to which individual demographic characteristics of owners influence capital
structure decisions. Using the Federal Reserve’s 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, we estimate the joint
effects of traditional capital structure determinants and manager age, gender, education, business experience,
sophistication, and wealth on the capital structure of single-owner corporations. By calculating the marginal
contribution of personal risk tolerance, we demonstrate that owner preference contributes meaningfully to the
explained variation in capital structure decisions.
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The Role of Owner in Capital Structure Decisions: An Analysis of Single-Owner Corporations
Traditional capital structure theory is an important part of finance with most of the
fundamental theories originating over twenty-five years ago.1 While there have been a large
number of articles on traditional capital structure theory since this time, few fundamental
changes have been proposed. An assumption that has remained persistent over time is that
owner characteristics do not matter in the capital structure decisions of firms, since the theory
implicitly assumes these owners have well diversified personal portfolios (Modigliani and Miller
(1958)). We argue that this is not the case for many owners of firms and demonstrate that
individual demographic characteristics of owners can help better explain capital structure
decisions.
Unlike the standard assumptions in portfolio theory, many owners of businesses do not
hold a diversified portfolio. This is particularly true for small firms wherein the owner of the
firm tends to serve as manager, resulting in little or no separation of ownership from control.
Take for instance, single-owner C and S corporations. While C and S corporations enjoy the
benefits of limited liability, the owners of these firms commonly pledge personal as well as
business assets as collateral in order to secure requisite financing, and thus the personal assets
and business assets tend to be commingled—just as is the case for proprietorships and
partnerships. This results in a further reduction in the personal diversification by these owners.
Since business failure can lead to financial loss or ruin at the personal level, individual owner
preferences should affect the capital structure of their business. Similarly, families that have a
great deal of wealth tied up in their businesses would not be considered to have a diversified
portfolio. It is estimated that 80% of businesses in the United States and 95% of businesses
world-wide are owned by families (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg (1997) and Litz
(1995), respectively). These businesses include sole proprietorships, LLCs, partnerships, and C
and S corporations. The preferences and risk tolerance of these owners will play a role in their
choice of capital structure. There are also many CEOs and other senior managers that have a
great deal of financial wealth tied up in company stock or stock options as well as their largely
undiversified human capital. Although many companies may have shareholders that are
diversified, the decision makers (top management, controlling families) are not. The choices
these individuals make regarding the firm’s capital structure can have a profound impact on their
own personal finances. Personal preferences and the risk tolerance of these individuals play a
role in the business decision making.
Utilizing data from the Federal Reserve’s 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances
(SSBF), we examine the leverage ratios of C and S corporations owned entirely by one
individual, taking into account both traditional capital structure determinants and personal risk
tolerance. Traditional capital structure considerations include agency theory, asymmetric
1 Some major traditional capital structure theory pieces come from Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963), Jensen and Meckling
(1976) (agency theory), Akerlof (1970) (asymmetric information), Spence (1973) and Ross (1977) (signaling), Miller (1977)
(taxes), Warner (1977) (bankruptcy costs), and Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) (pecking-order theory).
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information, and bankruptcy/distress costs. Extant literature in corporate finance suggests that
these issues are relevant not only to large public corporations but also to privately held
businesses (Mills and Schumann (1985), Ang (1991 and 1992), Hutchinson (1996), Berger and
Udell (1998), Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson (1995), Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000), Romano,
Tanewski, and Smyrnios (2000)).
Extant literature on individual risk-taking behavior shows that demographic and
socioeconomic factors influence individual risk tolerance, e.g., gender, age, wealth, income,
education, personal business experience, and sophistication of the individual. That is, an
individual’s ability and willingness to bear risk could be shaped by his or her personal
characteristics. It is generally believed that males are more risk tolerant than females and that
risk taking tends to decrease with age and increase with education level, higher levels of income,
wealth, professional experience, and sophistication.2
While many of these relationships were discovered in the psychology literature some
time ago, there has been a growing body of literature in finance focusing on the relationship
between individual manager characteristics and firm performance. Most relevant to our paper
include studies that consider the effects of manager characteristics on corporate behavior and
performance, such as Graham and Harvey (2001), Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Ben-David,
Graham, and Harvey (2007).
Graham and Harvey (2001) examine capital budgeting, cost of capital, and capital
structure of firms via cross-sectional survey data on 392 chief financial officers (CFOs), 64% of
which are publicly traded. By assuming that the CFOs act as agents for the Chief Executive
Officers (CEOs), Graham and Harvey (2001) examine the relation between the executive’s
responses and firm characteristics, including information on CEOs such as management
ownership, CEO age, and the education of the CEO (MBA to other). Among their findings, they
show that CEOs holding MBA degrees tend to use more sophisticated valuation techniques,
while older CEOs favor the payback period as a capital budgeting technique. Graham and
Harvey (2001) find little evidence that executives are concerned about asymmetric information,
transaction costs, free cash flows, or personal taxes, but do find some support for the pecking-
order and trade-off capital structure theories.
2 For risk taking and gender, see Barsky et al. (1997), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Donkers, Melenberg, and van Soest (2001),
Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Jonker (2002), Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie (2004), and Eckel and Grossman (2008); as summarized
by Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and Weel (2008), risk taking tends to increase sharply in adolescence (Steinberg (2004), (2007))
and then throughout adulthood tends to decrease with age (Dohmen et al. (2005)). This relationship would be represented by an
inverted U-shaped curve. For risk taking and age, see Wallach and Kogan (1961), McInish (1982), Morin and Suarez (1983), Palsson
(1996), Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie (2004), Dohmen et al. (2005); for risk taking and education, see Weiss (1972), Binswanger
(1980, 1981), Grable and Lytton (1999), Xiao, Alhabeeb, Hong, and Haynes (2001), Guiso and Paiella (2001), Hallahan, Faff, and
McKenzie (2004), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Anderson et al. (2005), and Belzil and Leonardi (2006); for risk taking and
income/wealth, see Friedman (1974), Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1975), Blume (1978), Shaw (1996), Grable and Lytton
(1999), Xiao, Alhabeeb, Hong, and Haynes (2001), Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie (2004); for risk taking and professional
experience/sophistication, see Grey and Gordon (1978), Masters (1989), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Grable and Lytton (1999), and
Xiao, Alhabeeb, Hong, and Haynes (2001).
3
TheJournal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 14, Issue 3, Fall 2010
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) investigate whether individual managers matter by tracking
top managers across different firms over time. Manager fixed effects are found to explain a
significant amount of the heterogeneity in investment, financial, and organizational practices of
firms. In terms of observable managerial characteristics, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) test the
effects of age and education on firm behavior and find that older groups of managers tend to be
financially more conservative, while managers with an MBA degree follow more aggressive
strategies. In a related paper, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that younger mutual fund
managers who attended higher quality schools (higher SAT scores) are more risk tolerant in their
investment decisions and earn higher rates of returns.
A number of recent studies have focused on the overall optimism, or overconfidence, of
top executives. Goel and Thakor (2005) develop a model where agents of a priori unknown
ability are being judged relative to each other to determine who wins the race for CEO.3 They
show that overconfident agents who underestimate project risk have a higher probability of being
chosen CEO than otherwise identical managers. The rationale stems from the fact that
promotion of managers in firms tends to be tied to past performance, which is correlated to the
risk taken by these agents. As Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) summarize the argument,
“the variance of the outcomes from their actions is greater, and therefore overconfident managers
will be over-represented among the right-tail “winners” and are more likely to get promoted.”
Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) empirically test whether CFO optimism affects
corporate policies via twenty-five quarterly surveys between March 2001 and March 2007 on
senior executives, mostly CFOs. Using a survey-based proxy for overconfidence, they show that
companies with overconfident CFOs tend to invest more and have higher debt leverage, and that
merger announcements by these firms are negatively received by investors. Demographic
characteristics are collected for only two of the twenty-five surveys (roughly 400 CFOs), and
few significant relations are found between overconfidence and demographic attributes (not
tabulated). Barros and da Silveira (2007) and Hackbarth (2008) also test the effects of CEO
overconfidence on corporate behavior, and similarly find that firms with overconfident managers
are associated with higher leverage ratios.4
While it has been becoming increasingly clear that individual managers have an effect on
firm behavior and performance, the scope and magnitude of these effects is undetermined. Our
study is the first to use a comprehensive set of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of
firm managers to explore their effects on managerial decision-making. These characteristics
include manager age, gender, education, business experience, sophistication, and wealth. This
extension is possible via the use of the 2003 SSBF, which provides detailed information on both
3 In a prior study, Lazear (2004) argues that while workers are promoted due to meeting or exceeding some standard, the
promotion is not based solely on lasting ability, but also on transitory components that may reflect short-term luck. This results
in a regression of the mean, creating a “Peter principle” (Peter and Hull (1969)). Lazear (2004) shows that although firms inflate
the promotion criterion to offset the regression bias, the effect is never eliminated. Faria (2000) and Fairburn and Malcolmson
(2001) explain the “Peter principle” as a byproduct of using promotion to solve a moral hazard problem, where firms choose
promotion because workers must live with the consequences of their decision.
4 See Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b) for a review of the relevant psychology and experimental evidence on
overconfidence, as well as alternative proxies for overconfidence.
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the personal and business characteristics of 536 single-owner C and S corporations. By
calculating the marginal contribution of personal risk tolerance, we demonstrate that the
preference of the owner accounts for 33% to 60% of the explained variation in the capital
structure decisions of these owners. Our results also show that firm leverage is positively related
to owner age, business experience, sophistication, number of financial institutions used by the
owner, sales of the firm, and whether or not the owner uses computers for business purpose or
pledges collateral.
This is the first study to quantify the extent of individual manager effects and to also
suggest solidifying personal risk characteristics as a fundamental component in traditional capital
structure theory. Our study serves as a baseline, using data from single-owner, privately-held C
and S corporations. From an empirical standpoint, this baseline provides the cleanest way to
estimate individual preferences due to the fact that the personal and business assets of these
owners tend to be commingled. A natural extension to this study would be to look at multiple-
owner privately-held firms, and, eventually, at publicly traded firms; however, confounding
problems such as the separation of ownership and control, conflicting preferences from multiple
owners, and the design of higher power compensation packages to low ownership managers may
cause challenges in identifying specific determinants in the capital structure of these firms.
The rest of the paper is developed as follows. We describe the data in Section II.
Methodology is presented in Section III and results in Section IV. In Section V, we conclude.
II. Data
We use data from the Federal Reserve’s 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances
(SSBF). Conducted during 2004-2005 for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and released in September of 2006, the SSBF gathered information on a nationally-
representative stratified-random sample of for-profit, nonfinancial, nonfarm, nonsubsidiary
business enterprises that had fewer than 500 employees and were in operation as of year-end
2003 and on the date of the interview. The 2003 SSBF has detailed information on firm and
owner characteristics for 4,240 firms, including 1,284 sole proprietors, 215 partnerships, 200
LLCs, 47 LLPs, and 2,494 C and S Corporations. The sample is representative of approximately
6.3 million firms that met the target population definition and were listed on the Dun’s Market
Identifier file as of May 2004. As with most surveys, there is a certain amount of missing data
for nearly all SSBF questions. Approximately 1.8% of all values collected were missing. FRB
staff imputed most of these missing values via a randomized regression model but provide
multiple implicates to enable researchers to account for the additional variance introduced by
imputation.5 The public-use data set contains five implicates of the 4,240 firms, for a total of
21,200 firm-implicate observations, which enables researchers to quantify the effects that
imputed values have on estimates of standard errors. All regressions reported in our study make
5 For detailed information on how the imputations were conducted and how to properly use them, see pages 14-16 and 40-51 of
the Technical Codebook of the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances.
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use of the multiple implicates and sampling weights, which enables us to obtain unbiased
coefficient estimates of the target population’s statistics.6
We begin by excluding sole proprietors, partnerships, LLCs, and LLPs from the sample,
leaving a sample of 2,494 firms (946 C and 1,548 S corporations).7 This is in attempt to create a
sample of small businesses that is most representative of firm samples typically used in
traditional capital structure studies, which tend to be corporations that offer limited liability and
easy transferability. By including C and S corporations with limited liability protection, we are
able to identify those owners who are willing to give up the protection by pledging personal
assets as collateral. This allows us to separate those who are overoptimistic/overconfident, and
to study the effect of giving up limited liability protection on debt increases. We further reduce
the sample to include only those firms that are 100% owned by a single individual, resulting in
940 firms (289 C and 651 S corporations). From an empirical standpoint, single-owner firms
provide the cleanest way to estimate individual preferences. We also drop firms that fail to
report total assets and firms that report non-positive total assets, leaving 928 firms (268 C and
642 S Corporations). Since our sample focus is on small businesses and most banks use $10
million as the cut-off for small business, we exclude firms with greater than $10 million in sales,
leaving a sample of 842 firms (259 C and 583 S corporations).8 To avoid skewness in results, we
also exclude firms with greater than $10 million in total assets, leaving 835 firms (256 C and 579
S corporations). We also attempt to identify and eliminate constrained firms, where they are no
longer able to choose their desired capital structure. Firms that were either discouraged from
applying for loans in fear of rejection or were denied a loan or renewal of line of credit over the
past three years were dropped from the sample, leaving 675 firms (211 C and 464 S
Corporations). Also, firms with negative equity were eliminated from the sample, resulting in a
final sample of 536 firms (160 C and 376 S Corporations).
We use the leverage ratio, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets, to study the
capital structure of these firms. Definitions of all variables used in the study are displayed in
Appendix A. Firms with higher leverage ratios are to be associated with single owner firms who
are willing to take greater financial risks. In contrast, the same could not be said if we were
dealing with multiple-owner firms, as firm risk may result from the culmination of conflicting
preferences of multiple owners. While no winsorizing is necessary for the leverage ratio
distribution, some of our explanatory variables have a few extreme outliers. We choose to
winsorize these problematic variables at the 99% level.
For traditional capital structure determinants, we choose the best possible proxies from
available data for agency costs, asymmetric information, and bankruptcy/distress costs. These
include whether or not the single owner is also the manager of the firm vs. those that hired
6 It appears that few studies to date have properly used the implicates and weighting statistics to account for the stratification.
According to the Technical Handbook of the 2003 SSBF, unweighted sample means and frequencies will give unbiased estimates
of the sample, but biased estimates of the population. This is especially true for variables that are closely related to firm size.
7 There are only 11 LLCs that are 100% owned by a single individual that filed taxes as a corporation, and are therefore dropped
from the sample.
8 We run our analyses with and without firms with sales exceeding $10 million and find no significant differences in results (not
tabulated).
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another person as manager (agency cost variable); the age of the firm and the number of financial
institutions used by the firm (asymmetric information); and whether or not the owner has
declared bankruptcy in the last 7 years, a categorical representation of the Dun & Bradstreet
Credit Score, the traditional one-digit industry classification, return on assets, firm sales, and
number of employees (bankruptcy/financial-distress costs).9
Socioeconomic and demographic variables of the firm owner are separated into one of
two groups, measures of willingness to bear risk or ways to reduce risk. Measures of willingness
to bear risk include age, gender, and wealth of owner, as well as owner loans to the firm. We use
age of the owner as a measure of risk bearing, as the age of an individual has been shown to be a
reasonable predictor of risk-taking activity; with younger people engaging in higher risk
activities. The sex of the owner is used as a measure of risk since males are generally believed to
be more risk tolerant; however, our sample is primarily composed of entrepreneurs, so our results
may suffer from a self-selection bias since entrepreneurs tend to be more risk tolerant than non-
entrepreneurs. That is, we may find that female entrepreneurs are as risk tolerant as male
entrepreneurs. Wealth of the owner is comprised of owner equity in firm, owner equity in
primary residence, and other net worth of owner. The rationale for using wealth of the owner as
a measure of risk is similar in theory to using the age of the owner in that wealthier (younger)
managers have additional means (time) from which to recover from losses incurred from riskier
activities. Owner loan to firm represents the extent to which owners are willing to comingle
personal assets with business assets, and thus is used as a measure of owner’s willingness to bear
risk.
Although risk-taking is a necessity in any business venture, we consider determinants that
may reduce risk of firms from action taken, specifically the sophistication, education, and
experience of the owner. As proxies for sophistication, we consider whether or not the owner
uses computers for business purposes and the number of business tasks for which the owner uses
computers. Computer usages may include online banking, e-mail, purchasing business products
or services, applying for loans or other forms of credit, managing inventory, administrative
functions such as word processing, managing the firm’s accounts/bookkeeping, other business
tasks, or to directly contribute to the firm’s primary business activity. The greater the computer
usage, the more savvy the owner is assumed to be. Owners with college degrees and/or graduate
degrees are assumed to have the additional knowledge necessary for better decision-making and
thus may be more capable than owners without college or graduate degrees to understand risky
choices. The same is implied for owners with more business experience. A more experienced
owner should have the ability to better analyze the risk and reward of opportunities that confront
them. We use dummy variables for whether or not the owner has a college degree or a graduate
degree (note these are two separate variables, not a single indicator). Business experience is
simply the number of years of experience the owner has managing or owning a business. We
also consider measures of the owner’s willingness to personally bear the risks in the business, or
to put personal wealth at risk in the business. These are: whether or not the owner pledges
9 Note that some variables can fall into multiple categories, e.g., whether or not the firm or individual declared bankruptcy in the
last 7 years, sales, and number of employees could also be associated with asymmetric information.
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collateral, guarantees a loan, or pledges personal assets to all or some firm loans and the ratio of
owner net worth to firm assets. The last item is inversely related to the extent owners’ wealth is
tied up in the business; it is also a measure of personal wealth diversification.
We also collect information on the trade credit of these firms as a means to assess their
relative financial health. We identify firms that have paid late on trade credit as potentially
distressed and firms that have high percentages of late payments as distressed or severely
distressed. We discuss the use of these characterizations below.
III. Methodology
To provide new evidence that owner preference contributes meaningfully to the
explained variation in capital-structure decisions, we first compare the mean leverage ratios of
the firm owners according to the various firm and owner characteristics discussed above.
Secondly, we estimate the joint effects that traditional capital-structure determinants and
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics have on firm leverage ratios. As with all of our
regression estimates, we use SAS survey procedures to obtain unbiased coefficient estimates.10
The first regression to estimate is:
levratioi = γ1 + γ2TCSi + εi (1)
where: levratioi is leverage ratio [(total liabilities)/(total assets)] for firm i; several alternative
measures of leverage are used in the estimations. TCSi is a set of independent variables
containing traditional variables used to explain capital structure for firm i that are constructed
from the SSBF database. These are: a dummy variable equal to one if the owner is the manager
of the firm, age of the firm in years, the number of financial institutions used by the firm, a
dummy variable equal to one if the owner has declared bankruptcy in the last 7 years, a
categorical representation of the Dun & Bradstreet credit score ranging from 1 (most risky) to 6
(least risky), dummy variables for the traditional one-digit industry classification, return on
assets of firm, the log of firm sales, and number of firm employees.
εi is the error term for firm i. γ’s are coefficients to be estimated.
Next, we estimate the joint effects that the socio-economic and demographic
determinants of the owner have on each of the firm leverage ratios. We first use the same survey
techniques to estimate the following regression:
levratioi = γ1 + γ2PRTi + εi (2)
10 First, we utilize PROC SURVEYREG to estimate our parameters separately for each implicate, appropriately adjusting for
sample weights and sample design. Next, we use PROC MIANALYZE to estimate the between-imputation variance of each
parameter and then combine the between-imputation variance with sampling variance to obtain an overall (sample and
imputation) variance. Coefficient estimates and their statistical significance are then analyzed.
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where levratioi, εi, and γ’s are defined as above. PRTi is a set of personal risk tolerance or ability
to deal with risks variables, including age of the owner in years, a dummy variable equal to one
if the owner is female, the dollar amount owner loans to firm, the dollar amount of owner equity
in primary residence, the dollar amount of owner equity in firm, the dollar amount of other net
worth of owner, a dummy variable equal to one if the owner uses computers for business
purposes, the number of business tasks for which the owner uses computers, a dummy variable
equal to one if the owner has a college degree, a dummy variable equal to one if the owner has a
graduate degree, owner business experience in years, a dummy variable equal to one if the owner
has pledged collateral, a dummy variable equal to one if the owner guarantees a loan, and a
dummy variable equal to one if the owner pledges personal assets.
Finally, we regress firm leverage ratios on the full model. The full model is:
levratioi = γ1 + γ2TCSi + γ3PRTi + εi (3)
where levratioi, TCSi, PRTi, εi, and γs are defined as above. We then take the difference between
the explained variations in the expanded traditional with owner’s risk taking variables model (3)
to that of the traditional variables only regression model (1) to determine the marginal
contribution (statistical) of the personal risk-tolerance variables in explaining the observed
capital structure of these firms.
Our purpose is to report empirically the extent personal risk characteristics contribute to
the explained variation in capital-structure decisions. We predict that female owners and older
owners will have a negative and significant effect on the observed leverage ratios, while
education, wealth, business experience, sophistication, and owner’s willingness to pledge
collateral or loan money to the firm will have a positive and significant effect on the observed
leverage ratios.
In the next set of regressions, we consider a possible endogeneity problem as the owners
may reach the decisions on several variables the same time they decide on firm leverage. These
variables are whether or not the owner pledges collateral, guarantees a loan, or pledges personal
assets. We estimate these variables separately as a function of all exogenous variables in the
variables sets, TCS and PRT, as in two stage least squares.
yi = γ1 + γ2TCSi + γ3PRTi + ε (4)
where TCSi, PRTi, εi, and γs are defined as above. yi is either a collateral, guarantee, or personal
assets dummy variable equal to one if firm owner i pledges collateral, guarantees a loan, or
pledges personal assets, respectively.
First, we use the survey techniques as in the previous regressions, regressing yi on TCSi,
then on PRTi, and finally on both TCSi and PRTi. This allows us to measure the incremental
contributions of owner’s personal characteristics on their willingness to commit more personal
wealth to the business. To consider the possible endogeneous relationship we include eq. (4)
9
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along with eq. (3) in a simultaneous system, adding collateral, guarantee, and personal assets as
an independent variable and use two-stage least squares to estimate the system.
To further analyze the role of collateral, we divide the firms into two subsamples based
on whether or not the owner has pledged personal assets, guaranteed, or cosigned to obtain
recent business related loans, line of credits, or leases. We interpret the pledging of personal
assets, etc., as evidence that the owner commingles personal assets with business assets, whereas
non-pledging reflects an owner isolating personal assets from business assets.11 This
demarcation is of practical significance, as it reflects whether unlimited liability of the corporate
business form is retained or not by their owners.
Up to this point, we have assumed that the leverage ratios for our sample of firms reflect
the levels of risk aversion of the owners. However, there is a problem common to all empirical
estimations of capital structure based on theory – the theory predicts a capital structure assuming
the managers or owners have the freedom to choose. Over time, however, many firms can lose
this ability to choose, such as when the business or owner falls on hard times. In some cases, the
firms may be distressed to the point where more debt, due to addition or even delay or late
payment, may be essential to continue operations. Thus, the observed leverage ratio may not
truly reflect the risk aversion of the owner, but instead reflect a forced outcome. To control for
these types of situations, we attempt to identify and eliminate these financially constrained firms
from the sample.
We begin by collecting information on the trade credit of these firms, which is short-term
financing extended by suppliers to firms allowing for payment of goods and services to be made
some time after the delivery date. The terms of these credit arrangements are generally
structured such that the benefits of early payments and the penalties of late payments are
substantial (Petersen and Rajan (1994)).12 Firms that extend their trade credit (i.e., pay late)
suffer both pecuniary and reputational penalties, resulting in both higher cost financing than that
associated with institutional lending and potential loss of future trade credit (Petersen and Rajan
(1994, 1997)). Given the severity of the consequences, we identify firms in our sample that have
paid late on trade credit as potentially distressed and firms that have high percentages (>50%) of
late payments as distressed, and firms that have paid late on trade credit 100% of the time as
severely distressed. Initially, we exclude the severely distressed firms from the sample and rerun
previous regressions according to the specifications in regression equations (1) through (3). Next
we exclude the distressed firms and repeat the analysis. Finally, we eliminate the potentially
distressed firms and repeat.
11 However, it may be the case that owners who pledge personal assets are still able to shelter personal assets in the event of firm
bankruptcy through state-specific bankruptcy exemptions. Lin and White (2001) investigate the relationship between bankruptcy
exemptions and the availability of credit, and provide a detailed breakdown of homestead and personal exemptions under state
bankruptcy laws. Unfortunately, location specific information (including state) is classified and unavailable in SSBF, so we are
unable to consider specific homestead and personal asset exemptions in our analysis.
12 An example given by Smith (1987) includes a 10-2-30 term, where firms are given a 2 percent discount if the balance is paid in
full within 10 days and no discount if paid in 30 days. By foregoing the discount in this example, the firm is essentially
borrowing at an annual rate of 44.6 percent (Peterson and Rajan (1994)).
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By eliminating distressed firms from the sample, we hope to show an overall better fit for
the model, as well as improvement to the significance of both the traditional capital structure and
personal risk tolerance coefficients.
IV. Results
4.A Univariate Results
We present descriptive statistics in Table I. The leverage ratios of our final sample (536
firms) have an intuitively pleasing range from 0 to 1 with a standard deviation of 0.309 and a
mean and median of 0.356 and 0.305, respectively. Approximately 93.3% of the firm owners in
our sample manage the day-to-day operations of their firm, while the mean age of the firm is
16.6 years. The average firm uses 2.7 financial institutions for their financing and three firm
owners have declared bankruptcy in the previous 7 years (to survey date). The sample mean
(median) of the categorical representation of the Dun & Bradstreet credit score is 4.2 (4) and
ranges from 1 to 6, with 1 being the most risky and 6 being the least risky. The mean return on
assets is approximately 1, the mean sales $1,644,423, and the mean number of employees is 20.
Table I here
Turning to personal risk characteristics, the mean and median age of the firm owner is 53
with a standard deviation of 10. Female owners represent approximately 18.3% of the sample,
while the average (median) total net worth of the firm owners is $1,849,325 ($1,011,308). The
average owner in our sample loans $1,744 to their firm. Approximately 93.1% of the firm
owners in our sample use computers for business purposes, while the mean number of tasks
using computer is 4.6. Over half (a fifth) of the firm owners have a college degree (graduate
degree), and the average owner has 22 years of business experience. A little less than half of the
firm owners pledge collateral or guarantee a loan, while less than 15% pledge personal assets.
Table II presents mean leverage ratios by various owner characteristic subgroups and
reports t-test results that indicate the statistical significance between the mean values being
compared. Comparisons among the subgroups for the full sample are presented in Panel A;
comparisons between the subgroups by gender are reported in Panel B; and comparisons
between owners who pledge collateral and those that do not are presented in Panel C.
Table II here
The results in Panel A reveal no significant difference between the mean leverage ratios
of female and those of male owners. As discussed above, this may indicate that the male and
female entrepreneurs/owners in our sample are equally risk tolerant/averse, however, a closer
analysis in Panel B suggests that the female subsample is homogeneous while the male
subsample is heterogeneous. Significant differences in the leverage ratios is observed for 9 of
the 15 comparison variables among male firm owners, while only 2 comparison variables reveal
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significant and consistent differences among female owners. With respect to male owners, the
mean leverage ratio is 51.9% higher for computers users versus non-users, up to 49% higher for
more sophisticated owners, 61.9% higher for those that pledge collateral, 63.4% higher for those
that guarantee loans, and 23.4% higher for those that pledge personal assets. Conversely, the
mean leverage ratio between males is lower for those with college degrees, graduate degrees,
greater firm equity, and greater wealth exposure. Significant and consistent differences in
leverage ratios between females are observed only for those that pledge collateral and guarantee
loans. Similar to the intra-male comparison, mean leverage ratios of females that pledge
collateral or guarantee loans are higher than those that do not (52.1% and 53.4% higher,
respectively). The comparisons between males and females is interesting for the reason that we
know it is not a simple comparison of the sexes, but rather it is the heterogeneity of the male
subsample that allow us to see differences among gender.
Given that both intra-female and intra-male comparisions in Panel B reveal significant
differences in mean leverage ratios between those that pledge collateral or guarantee a loan and
those that do not, it is not surprising to find similar results in Panel A for the full sample. Mean
leverage ratios are 60.1% higher for firm owners that pledge collateral and 61.7% higher for
those that guarantee a loan. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Mean
leverage ratios for firm owners that pledge personal assets is 20.6% higher, but only marginally
significant at the 10% level. Panel C of Table II breaks the sample up by pledgers and non-
pledgers, and presents subgroup comparisons. While the mean leverage ratios for owners that
pledge collateral are higher than non-pledgers for every single variable comparison, there is little
variation within the pledger subsample and little variation within the non-pledger subsample.
Only changes in firm equity are consistently positive and significant at the 1% level for both
pledgers and non-pledgers, while changes in sophistication positively influence only the owners
that pledge collateral. The most sophisticated (upper tercile) firm owners who pledge collateral
have a mean leverage ratio 53.5% greater than the least sophisticated (lower tercile) firm owners
that pledge collateral, and the moderately sophisticated (middler tercile) have a mean leverage
ratio that is 29.7% greater than the least sophisticated. These differences are significant at the
1% level. Notwithstanding the few differences in the intra-group comparisons, Panel A and
Panel C show us that, while there is a difference between pledgers and non-pledgers, there is
little variation within each of these subgroups. This finding underscores the importance of
controlling for collateral.
Finishing off Table II, Panel A shows that firm owners who use computers have 40.1%
higher leverage ratio than non-computer users, a difference that is statistically significant at the
5% level. Among computer users, owners that use computers most extensively (upper tercile of
sophisticated) have, on average, 48.2% higher leverage ratios than those that use computers the
least (lower tercile). Similarly, the leverage ratios of moderate computer users (middle tercile)
are 30.3% higher than those that use computers the least. Both differences are significant at the
1% level. More educated firm owners, as evidenced by a college degree or graduate degree,
have lower leverage ratios on average, although the difference is only marginally statistically
significant at the 10% level. Owners with greater firm equity and higher wealth exposure tend to
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have lower leverage ratios, while home equity, other net worth, and total net worth do not appear
to influence leverage. Similarly, the age of the owner and business experience do not appear to
be significant factors for leverage.
The wealth exposure of firm owners is examined in more detail in Table III. It is clear
from Panel A of Table III that owners with greater wealth exposure (lower inverse wealth
exposure tercile) make more personal commitments on loans or lines of credit. Approximately
60% of the firm owners in the lower wealth exposure tercile pledge collateral and approximately
58.1% guarantee loans. This is in sharp contrast to the owners in the upper wealth exposure
tercile where less than 38% pledge collateral or guarantee loans. Similarly, 17.9% of firm
owners in the lower wealth exposure tercile pledge personal assets, while only 9.5% of owners in
the upper wealth exposure tercile pledge personal assets. Because pledging of collateral, etc.,
allows firm owners to acquire more debt, the results suggest that relatively more diversified
owners are also more risk averse.13 This notion is further supported by Panel B of Table III
where firm owners with more wealth exposure (lower and middle inverse wealth exposure
terciles) have higher leverage ratios than firm owners with the least wealth exposure. This is true
for both the firm owners that make personal commitments and for those that do not. For firm
owners that make personal commitments, high wealth exposure firm owners have 34.9% greater
leverage than low wealth exposure firms, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1%
level. The result is consistent with the role of owner’s risk tolerance (aversion), owners who are
more (less) averse to risks are less (more) likely to invest a greater portion of own wealth into the
business, i.e., they do (do not) diversify. They are also less (more) likely to pledge or guarantee
with own remaining assets.
Table III here
Panel B of Table III also presents personal risk characteristics by inverse wealth exposure
terciles for firm owners that make personal commitments and those that do not. It is interesting
to note here that owners with college degrees and/or graduate degrees are more highly
represented in the middle and upper inverse wealth exposure terciles (lower wealth exposure),
regardless of whether they make personal commitments or not. Conversely, the age of the
owner, business experience, sophistication, computer usage, and gender do not appear to be
significant factors in explaining variations in wealth exposure.
4.B Multivariate Results
We present weighted least squares regression results in Table IV where the dependent
variable is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Regression results for traditional capital
structure determinants are reported in Column (1), personal risk characteristics in Column (2),
13 However, a self-selection bias may be present as firms with less desirable balance sheets may be required to make
personal commitments, while firm owners with substantial wealth may not require outside financing and thus are not
required to make personal commitments. We address this possible endogeneous relationship below.
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and the full model in Column (3). As the overarching goal of this paper is to explore the
significance of individual characteristics in capital structure decisions, we begin by focusing on
the explanatory power of the subset of variables. Based on the adjusted R-square, traditional
capital structure determinants explain approximately 15% of the variability in the capital
structure decisions of the single-owner firms. When personal risk characteristics are added to the
model the adjusted R-square increases to 0.26, indicating that personal risk characteristics
account for approximately 42.3% of the explained variation. These results suggest that owner
characteristics are important when evaluating the capital structure of firms.
Table IV here
Based on Table IV, older firms tend to have lower leverage ratios. For every ten year
increase in firm age, there is a corresponding 2.3% to 3.1% decrease in leverage, a difference
that is significant at the 10% to 5% level, respectively. Firms with higher return on asset ratios
also tend to have less leverage, where a 100 basis point increase in the profit to asset ratio results
in a 4 basis point decrease in leverage, a change that is significant at the 1% level. The number
of financial institutions used by the firms is positively related to leverage, where an increase of
one financial institution corresponds to an increase of 3% to 4.1% in leverage. These results are
significant at the 1% level. Similarly, firms that have higher sales tend to have higher leverage
ratios. Firms within the retail trade industry and the transportation, communication, and utility
industry are associated with higher leverage, however, the results are only marginally significant
at the 10% level (The leverage of these firms may be underestimated (and thus, more significant)
as some firms may use leasing as in retail).
Turning now to personal risk characteristics, Table IV reveals that the age of the owner,
owner computer use, sophistication, business experience, and the act of pledging collateral are
positively related to leverage, the results of which are mostly significant at the 1% level. For
every 10 year increase in the age of the owner, there is a corresponding 4% increase in leverage.
This result is contrary to expectations as the level of risk aversion has been shown to increase
with age, such as in Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie (2004), and
Dohmen et al. (2005). Firm owners that use computers for business purposes have on average
10% higher leverage ratios, while firm owners that use computers more extensively have even
higher leverage ratios, approximately 1.9% to 3.0% higher for each additional business related
computer task. A 10 year increase in business experience corresponds to a 4.2% to 4.7%
increase in leverage, suggesting that more experienced firm owners have more established
sources for funding. Firms that pledge collateral have approximately 9% to 15% higher leverage
ratios, indicating that the more risk tolerant owners could increase firm leverage by giving up
some or all limited liability protection on personal wealth. Based on the economic significance
of collateral and the possible endogeneous relationships discussed earlier, we explore the role of
pledging collateral in more detail below.14 Dollar amount of firm equity is inversely related to
14 We report two-stage least squares regressions in Appendix B where collateral is instrumented by three subsets of
variables and where the leverage ratio of firms is regressed on traditional capital structure determinants, personal
14
TheRole of Owner in Capital Structure Decisions: An Analysis of Single-Owner Corporations
firm leverage, and this relation is significant at the 1% level. For every $100,000 increase in
firm equity, there is a corresponding 2% decrease in firm leverage. It is consistent with the
desire of risk averse owners to limit risk of loss of larger personal investment in the firm.
To check for robustness in results reported in Table IV, we eliminate potentially
constrained firms and re-run the regressions. The new results are reported in Table V. When
severely distressed (late payments on trade credit 100% of the time) and distressed (late
payments on trade credit 50% or more) firms are eliminated from the sample, the magnitude and
statistical significance of the coefficients on traditional capital structure determinants and
personal risk characteristics remain nearly identical, and personal risk characteristics account for
40.7% and 38.5% of the explained variation in capital structure, respectively. When potentially
distressed (having paid late on trade credit at least once) firms are dropped, the age of the firm
loses significance, but all other coefficients remain statistically and economically significant and
the personal risk characteristics account for 43.5% of the explained variation in capital structure.
Table V here
In Table VI we use weighted least squares to analyze the factors involved with pledging
of collateral, guaranteeing, and pledging of personal assets to obtain requisite financing. Firm
owners that pledge collateral or guarantee loans are associated with using more financial
institutions, having higher sales, using computers for business purposes, and, to some extent,
being more sophisticated and having more business experience. Firms in the insurance/real
estate industry appear to be especially prone to pledging collateral, a result that is statistically
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on SIC insurance real estate ranges from .197 to
.255, which indicates that firms in this industry are 19.7% to 25.5% more likely to pledge
collateral, all else equal. Conversely, firm owners with college degrees are 9% to 11% less
likely to pledge collateral or guarantee a loan, the results of which are significant at mostly the
5% level. Similarly, firm owners with graduate degrees are 10% to 11% less likely to pledge
collateral. The decision to pledge personal assets is driven more by whether or not the firm
owner is the day-to-day manager, the amount of equity in the firm, and whether or not the owner
has previously made loans to their own firm. Firm owners that manage their own company are
17.2% to 19.5% less likely to pledge personal assets, a difference that is significant at the 5% to
1% level, respectively. Firm owners that have previously extended loans to their own company
are approximately 4.7% more likely to pledge personal assets, a result that is significant at the
1% level, consistent with greater co-mingling of business and personal assets. Greater firm
equity also increases the probability of pledging personal assets, where a $100,000 increase in
risk characteristics, and the full model. The three instruments employed are 1) the net worth of the owner and owner
equity in their primary home, 2) net worth of the owner and a categorical representation of the Dun & Bradstreet
credit ranking, and 3) all three instruments. The three sets of instruments provide similar results, all of which mimic
the results reported in Table IV. Based on Sargan statistics and corresponding p-values, the instrumental variables
chosen are suitable.
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firm equity corresponds to a 1.2% to 1.3% increase in the chance a firm owner pledges personal
assets.
Table VI here
In Table VII, we report weighted least squares regressions on subsamples of firm owners
based on whether or not they pledge collateral. The subsamples are approximately equal in size
with 258 firm owners that pledge collateral and 278 that do not. For both subsamples, personal
risk characteristics account for a substantial amount of the explained variation in capital structure
of these firms. For the collateral pledging firms, personal risk characteristics account for 33.3%
of the explained variation, and for the non-collateral pledging firms, they account for 60.0% of
the explained variation. Similar to the results reported in Table IV, the leverage ratios of both
pledgers and non-pledgers are positively related to sales and inversely related to their return on
assets ratio and their amount of firm equity. Similar to the full sample regression in Table IV,
but unique to pledgers, leverage ratios are inversely related to the age of the firm and positively
related to the secondary manufacturing industry dummy and sophistication. Unique to non-
pledgers, leverage is positively related to the number of financial institutions used, computer use,
and business experience and is inversely related to owner loans to the firm and having a college
degree. The coefficients on college degree range from -.088 to -.100 and are significant at the
5% and 1% level, respectively. This indicates that non-pledgers with college degrees tend to use
up to 10% lower leverage than do non college degree holders. While similarities exist between
the pledgers and non-pledgers and between these groups and the full sample, the differences
reported above demonstrate the need to control for collateral, as is done in Tables IV and V.
Overall, we show there are differences in the owners’ characteristics to explain why firms choose
to pledge personal assets or not.
Table VII here
V. Summary and Conclusion
Capital structure theory is a well studied discipline in finance. Much of the work in this
area has concentrated on agency theory, asymmetric information, and bankruptcy and distress
costs, while little work has focused on individual demographic or risk characteristics of firm
owners. In this study, we show that owner characteristics contribute meaningfully to the
explained variation in capital structure choices. Our results show that personal risk
characteristics, when included with traditional capital structure determinants, account for 33% to
60% of the explained variation in capital structure choices. This is the first study to quantify the
extent of individual owner effects and to provide support for incorporating personal risk
characteristics as a fundamental component in traditional capital structure theory.
Our results show that firm leverage, as measured by total liabilities divided by total
assets, is positively related to the owner age, business experience, sophistication, number of
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financial institutions used by the owner, sales of the firm, and whether or not the owner uses
computers for business purpose or pledges collateral. In addition, we that firm leverage is
negatively related to the age of the firm and the ratio of return on assets. No significant
differences are found between female and male owners, although substantial differences are
observed between male owners, including an inverse relationship between education and
leverage. An inverse relationship is also found between education and the choice to pledge
collateral or guarantee loans, where more educated owners are less willing to make personal
commitments. Moreover, less educated owners tend to have greater wealth exposure, make more
personal commitments, and have higher leverage ratios.
Our study contributes to the growing body of literature that focuses on the effects of
manager characteristics on corporate behavior and performance. While several studies have
considered manager characteristics such as education and age, we are the first to examine and
report the effects of a comprehensive set of individual demographic and personal risk
characteristics, which allows us to quantify the extent to which individual owners and managers
matter in capital structure decisions. Our results underscore the significance of the individual
owner and indicate that capital structure theory can be bolstered accordingly.
17
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Table I: Descriptive statistics for determinants of capital structure
This table presents summary statistics for 536 (160 C and 376 S Corporations) single-owner firms. The
variables include traditional capital structure determinants and socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics used to explain the capital structure decisions of firm owners. Please refer to Appendix
A for detailed descriptions of each variable.
N Mean Median 25% 75% Min Max SD
Lev ratio 536 0.356 0.305 0.055 0.608 0 1 0.309
Total assets 536 734830 214487 60000 770150 67 9502000 1299934
Total liabilities 536 323648 50500 5784 271832 0 6762000 755335
Owner managed 536 0.933 1 1 1 0 1 0.251
Age of firm 536 16.590 15 8 23 1 60 10.937
Number of finances 536 2.670 2 2 3 0 7 1.465
Indvl bankruptcy 536 0.006 0 0 0 0 1 0.075
D&B credit ranking 536 4.213 4 3 5 1 6 1.363
SIC wholesale trade 536 0.069 0 0 0 0 1 0.254
SIC retail trade 536 0.162 0 0 0 0 1 0.369
SIC mining construction 536 0.116 0 0 0 0 1 0.320
SIC primary mnfctrng 536 0.037 0 0 0 0 1 0.190
SIC scndry mnfctrng 536 0.058 0 0 0 0 1 0.234
SIC transp comm util 536 0.043 0 0 0 0 1 0.203
SIC insurance realestate 536 0.071 0 0 0 0 1 0.257
SIC business services 536 0.205 0 0 0 0 1 0.404
SIC profssnl services 536 0.239 0 0 0 0 1 0.427
ROA 536 1.007 0.186 0.007 0.752 -5.946 22.824 2.978
Sales 536 1644423 654610.5 221884 2000000 0 9931111 2235923
No. of employees 536 20 7 3 25 1 154 29
Age of owner 536 53 53 45 60 25 89 10
Female 536 0.183 0 0 0 0 1 0.387
Owner loan to firm 536 1744 0 0 0 0 100000 10039
Home equity 536 338961 200000 100000 400000 0 3000000 448494
Firm equity 536 406051 111688 31244 431990 0 5213720 744029
Other net worth 536 1112181 500000 150000 1100000 0 12000000 1816796
Total net worth 536 1849325 1011308 424287 2144837 142 12800000 2410526
Use computers 536 0.931 1 1 1 0 1 0.254
Sophistication 536 4.595 5 3 6 0 9 1.971
College degree 536 0.571 1 0 1 0 1 0.495
Graduate degree 536 0.222 0 0 0 0 1 0.416
Business exper. 536 21.987 20.5 14 30 0 62 11.430
Wealth exposure 536 20.166 2.910 1.067 8.941 0 433.163 63.055
Collateral 536 0.481 0 0 1 0 1 0.500
Guarantee 536 0.461 0 0 1 0 1 0.499
Personal assets 536 0.147 0 0 0 0 1 0.355
Collateral*net worth 536 3.892 0 0 2.682 0 85.520 11.904
Guarantee*net worth 536 3.798 0 0 2.360 0 85.520 11.911
Personal assets*net worth 536 0.621 0 0 0 0 25.411 2.175
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Table II: Leverage ratios and personal risk tolerance
This table analyzes mean leverage ratios of different subsets of personal risk characteristic variables, including gender of
firm owner, whether or not the owner extends loans to firm, whether or not the owner uses computers for business
purposes, whether or not the owner has a college or graduate degree, and whether or not the owner pledges collateral,
guarantees, or pledges personal assets to secure a loan or line of credit. Continuous variables are divided into terciles,
including age of the owner, amount of equity in owner home and firm, other net worth of owner, total net worth of owner,
sophistication of owner represented by the number of computer tasks used for business purposes, years of business
experience of owner, and wealth exposure represented by (total net worth – firm equity)/total assets. Values reported for
continuous variables are the mean leverage ratio for the given variable tercile. The leverage ratio is total liabilities divided
by total assets. Panel A presents comparisons based on the entire sample of single-owner firms, Panel B bisects the sample
by gender, and Panel C bisects the sample by whether or not the firm owner pledges collateral. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. t-statistic in parentheses.
Panel A: Full Sample
Lev ratio Obs. Lev ratio Obs.
Male 0.362 438 Graduate degree 0.313 119
Female 0.329 98 No graduate degree 0.368 417
Diff. in means 0.033 Diff. in means -0.055*
(0.946) (-1.710)
Owner loan to firm 0.431 21 Pledge collateral 0.442 258
No owner loan to firm 0.352 515 Don't pledge collateral 0.276 278
Diff. in means 0.079 Diff. in means 0.166***
(1.147) (6.437)
Use computers 0.363 499 Guarantee loan 0.448 247
Don't use computers 0.258 37 Don't gurantee loan 0.277 289
Diff. in means 0.105** Diff. in means 0.171***
(2.002) (6.631)
College degree 0.336 306 Pledge personal assets 0.416 79
No college degree 0.381 230 Don't pledge personal assets 0.345 457
Diff. in means -0.045* Diff. in means 0.071*
(-1.676) (1.899)
Lev ratio Diff. in means
Lower
tercile
(1)
Middle
tercile
(2)
Upper
tercile
(3)
(1) - (2) (2) - (3) (1) - (3)
Age of Owner 0.343 0.371 0.352 -0.028 0.019 -0.009
(-0.889) (0.581) (-0.263)
Home equity 0.368 0.338 0.360 0.030 -0.022 0.008
(0.924) (-0.693) (0.247)
Firm equity 0.432 0.309 0.325 0.122*** -0.016 0.106***
(3.482) (-0.572) (3.169)
Other net worth 0.359 0.350 0.358 0.009 -0.008 0.002
(0.277) (-0.237) (0.050)
Total net worth 0.372 0.346 0.348 0.026 -0.002 0.024
(0.778) (-0.061) (0.732)
Sophistication 0.284 0.370 0.421 -0.086*** -0.051 -0.137***
(-2.763) (-1.320) (-3.226)
Business exper. 0.338 0.359 0.371 -0.022 -0.011 -0.033
(-0.666) (-0.333) (-1.011)
Wealth exposure 0.423 0.348 0.295 0.076** 0.052 0.128***
(2.417) (1.580) (3.929)
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Table IV: Leverage ratios on traditional capital structure and personal risk tolerance variables
This table reports regression results of firm leverage ratios on firm and individual characteristics for the entire sample (536) of single-owner C and S-Corporations. Lev
ratio, total liabilities divided by total assets, is regressed over traditional capital structure variables, personal risk tolerance variables, and then on all of the variables.
Owner managed is a dummy variable that equals one if the owner is responsible for day-to-day operations and zero otherwise; Age of firm is the firm age in years
divided by 10; Number of finances is the number of financial institutions used by the firm; Indvl bankruptcy is a dummy variable that equals one if the owner has
declared bankruptcy in the last seven years and zero otherwise; D&B credit ranking is a categorical representation of the Dun and Bradstreet rank credit score with 1
being most risky and 6 least risky; SIC wholesale trade, SIC retail trade, SIC mining construction, SIC primary mnfctrng, SIC scndry mnfctrng, SIC transp comm util,
SIC insurance realestate, and SIC business services, are dummy variables based on the one-digit SIC codes; ROA is profit scaled by assets; Sales is the natural
logarithm of firm sales; No. of employees is the number of employees in firm divided by 10; Age of owner is the age of owner in years divide by 10; Female is a dummy
variable that equals one if the owner is female and zero otherwise; Owner loan to firm is the amount firm owner has lent to firm in tens of thousands. Home equity is the
amount of equity owner has in home or primary residence in hundreds of thousands; Firm equity is the amount of equity owner has in firm in hundreds of thousands;
Other net worth is the owner net worth not including equity in home and firm in hundreds of thousands; Use computers is a dummy variable that equals one if the
owner uses computers for business purposes and zero otherwise; Sophistication is the number of tasks owner uses computer for business purposes; College degree is a
dummy variable that equals one if the owner has a college degree and zero otherwise; Graduate degree is a dummy variable that equals one if owner has a graduate
degree and zero otherwise; Business exper is business experience of owner in years divided by 10; Wealth exposure is (owner net worth minus firm equity)/total assets;
and Collateral is a dummy variable that equals one if owner has pledged personal assets, guaranteed, or cosigned to secure a loan or line of credit. The following groups
of variables are highly correlated and are thus orthogonalized to eachother: a) Business exper, Age of firm, and Age of owner; b) Sales, No. of employees, and Firm
equity; c) Home equity and Other net worth; d) Sophistication and Use computers; and e) College degree and Graduate degree. t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**, and
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Tr
a
di
tio
n
a
lC
a
pi
ta
lS
tr
u
ct
u
re

D
et
er
m
in
a
n
ts

Owner managed 0.009 -0.002
(0.14) (-0.03)
Age of firm -0.031** -0.023*
(-2.21) (-1.71)
Number of finances 0.041*** 0.030***
(4.12) (2.97)
Indvl bankruptcy -0.183 -0.233
(-0.79) (-1.07)
D&B credit ranking -0.008 -0.008
(-0.82) (-0.76)
SIC wholesale trade 0.028 0.039
(0.52) (0.70)
SIC retail trade 0.071* 0.102**
(1.66) (2.22)
SIC mining construction 0.030 0.045
(0.63) (0.88)
SIC primary mnfctrng 0.029 0.006
(0.36) (0.07)
SIC scndry mnfctrng 0.096 0.120
(1.30) (1.62)
SIC transp comm util 0.125* 0.119*
(1.83) (1.68)
SIC insurance realestate 0.075 0.011
(1.41) (0.22)
SIC business services 0.006 -0.015
(0.15) (-0.36)
ROA -0.040*** -0.041***
(-3.75) (-4.10)
Sales 0.062*** 0.053***
(5.30) (4.61)
No. of employees -0.001 -0.005
(-0.09) (-0.58)
Pe
rs
o
n
a
lR
isk

C
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s
Age of owner 0.039*** 0.043***
(2.64) (2.97)
Female -0.025 0.003
(-0.77) (0.10)
Owner loan to firm -0.013 -0.033***
(-1.07) (-2.71)
Home equity 0.007** 0.004
(2.08) (1.16)
Firm equity -0.021*** -0.023***
(-5.92) (-6.80)
Other net worth 0.002* 0.001
(1.91) (0.88)
Use computers 0.108** 0.101**
(2.28) (2.16)
Sophistication 0.030*** 0.019**
(3.49) (2.24)
College degree -0.044 -0.015
(-1.43) (-0.50)
30
TheRole of Owner in Capital Structure Decisions: An Analysis of Single-Owner Corporations
Graduate degree -0.056* -0.030
(-1.78) (-0.83)
Business exper 0.047*** 0.042**
(2.60) (2.39)
Collateral 0.151*** 0.093***
(5.52) (3.36)
Constant 0.324*** 0.188*** 0.218**
(3.96) (4.08) (2.35)
Observations 536 536 536
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.26
Explained variation by
personal risk characteristics 42.3%
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Table VI: The role of collateral and personal guarantees
This table reports regression results of three alternative collateral definitions, collateral, guarantee, and personal assets on firm and individual characteristics for the
entire sample (530) of single-owner C and S-Corporations. Collateral is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm owner was required to pledge personal assets,
have a personal guarantee, cosigner, or other guarantor on a loan or line of credit, and zero otherwise. Guarantee is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm owner
was required to have a personal guarantee, cosigner, or other guarantor on a loan or line of credit, and zero otherwise. Personal assets is a dummy variable that equals
one if the firm owner was required to pledge personal assets to secure a loan or line of credit. All other variables are as defined in Table IV. t-statistics are in
parentheses. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Collateral Guarantee Personal assets
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tr
ad
iti
o
n
al

Ca
pi
ta
lS
tr
u
ct
u
re

D
et
er
m
in
an
ts

Owner managed 0.076 0.066 0.117 0.128 -0.172** -0.195***
(0.84) (0.72) (1.33) (1.42) (-2.52) (-2.81)
Age of firm -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.017 -0.011 -0.015
(-0.65) (-0.70) (-0.66) (-0.78) (-0.67) (-0.91)
Number of finances 0.111*** 0.102*** 0.120*** 0.109*** 0.029** 0.025**
(7.45) (6.54) (8.22) (7.19) (2.58) (2.10)
Indvl bankruptcy 0.350 0.389 0.358 0.382 0.408 0.432*
(1.00) (1.12) (1.05) (1.13) (1.54) (1.65)
D&B credit ranking -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.010 -0.001 0.003
(-0.07) (-0.10) (-0.51) (-0.63) (-0.09) (0.27)
SIC wholesale trade 0.039 -0.039 -0.014 -0.059 0.011 -0.023
(0.48) (-0.44) (-0.17) (-0.69) (0.18) (-0.35)
SIC retail trade 0.055 0.009 0.022 0.016 0.043 -0.032
(0.85) (0.12) (0.35) (0.23) (0.88) (-0.58)
SIC mining construction 0.086 -0.006 0.068 0.014 -0.013 -0.067
(1.19) (-0.07) (0.96) (0.18) (-0.24) (-1.09)
SIC primary mnfctrng -0.094 -0.205 -0.084 -0.158 -0.025 -0.053
(-0.78) (-1.60) (-0.71) (-1.26) (-0.27) (-0.55)
SIC scndry mnfctrng 0.090 -0.027 0.105 0.016 -0.119 -0.194**
(0.81) (-0.23) (0.97) (0.14) (-1.42) (-2.16)
SIC transp comm util 0.135 -0.013 0.120 0.021 -0.049 -0.106
(1.31) (-0.11) (1.19) (0.19) (-0.63) (-1.24)
SIC insurance realestate 0.255*** 0.197** 0.114 0.063 0.245*** 0.238***
(3.16) (2.34) (1.45) (0.76) (4.02) (3.76)
SIC business services 0.093 0.011 0.096* 0.044 -0.030 -0.052
(1.59) (0.16) (1.70) (0.69) (-0.67) (-1.06)
ROA -0.031* -0.022 -0.021 -0.012 -0.028** -0.023*
(-1.95) (-1.34) (-1.33) (-0.75) (-2.36) (-1.88)
Sales 0.048*** 0.045** 0.048*** 0.043** 0.004 0.004
(2.72) (2.46) (2.76) (2.42) (0.30) (0.26)
No. of employees 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.016 0.001 0.003
(0.88) (0.92) (1.26) (1.09) (0.05) (0.25)
Pe
rs
o
n
al

Ri
sk

Ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
Age of owner -0.011 0.012 -0.016 0.010 -0.007 -0.005
(-0.48) (0.53) (-0.68) (0.46) (-0.41) (-0.29)
Female -0.000 0.046 0.023 0.069 -0.029 -0.023
(-0.00) (0.88) (0.45) (1.36) (-0.74) (-0.59)
Owner loan to firm 0.012 -0.008 0.002 -0.022 0.048*** 0.047***
(0.63) (-0.43) (0.11) (-1.14) (3.45) (3.17)
Home equity 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.50) (-0.19) (0.93) (0.07) (-0.27) (0.19)
Firm equity 0.010* 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.012*** 0.013***
(1.78) (1.58) (1.57) (1.40) (3.03) (3.21)
Other net worth 0.003* -0.000 0.004** 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(1.96) (-0.04) (2.46) (0.67) (0.45) (-0.75)
Use computers 0.287*** 0.146* 0.322*** 0.181** 0.021 -0.045
(3.84) (1.95) (4.39) (2.47) (0.39) (-0.79)
Sophistication 0.034** 0.006 0.039*** 0.012 0.012 0.001
(2.50) (0.46) (2.92) (0.93) (1.22) (0.09)
College degree -0.110** -0.102** -0.105** -0.089* -0.021 -0.044
(-2.25) (-2.08) (-2.18) (-1.86) (-0.59) (-1.20)
Graduate degree -0.101** -0.113** -0.078 -0.070 0.011 -0.023
(-2.01) (-1.99) (-1.58) (-1.27) (0.31) (-0.54)
Business exper. 0.063** 0.042 0.053* 0.036 -0.009 -0.009
(2.18) (1.50) (1.90) (1.30) (-0.42) (-0.45)
Constant 0.039 0.173** 0.022 -0.022 0.091 -0.119 0.262*** 0.124** 0.365***
(0.31) (2.35) (0.15) (-0.19) (1.25) (-0.82) (2.79) (2.29) (3.25)
Observations 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.20 0.06 0.03 0.08
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Table VII: Collateral versus non-collateral
This table reports regression results of firm leverage ratios on two subsamples, firms that have pledged personal assets, guaranteed, or cosigned
to secure a loan or line of credit and firms that have not. All variables are as defined in Table IV. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
VARIABLES Collateral pledged sample No collateral pledged sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tr
ad
iti
o
n
al

Ca
pi
ta
lS
tr
u
ct
u
re

D
et
er
m
in
an
ts

Owner managed -0.007 -0.012 0.024 0.063
(-0.09) (-0.16) (0.26) (0.71)
Age of firm -0.068*** -0.039* -0.013 -0.018
(-3.33) (-1.86) (-0.67) (-0.95)
Number of finances 0.010 0.013 0.059*** 0.074***
(0.89) (1.15) (3.13) (3.82)
Indvl bankruptcy -0.241 -0.294 -0.176 -0.134
(-0.95) (-1.22) (-0.43) (-0.35)
D&B credit ranking -0.012 -0.002 -0.007 -0.008
(-0.90) (-0.17) (-0.43) (-0.54)
SIC wholesale trade -0.065 -0.037 0.065 0.029
(-0.81) (-0.45) (0.88) (0.37)
SIC retail trade 0.019 0.010 0.090 0.173**
(0.32) (0.15) (1.44) (2.55)
SIC mining construction -0.077 0.005 0.086 0.066
(-1.20) (0.07) (1.24) (0.90)
SIC primary mnfctrng 0.157 0.202 0.018 -0.065
(1.15) (1.50) (0.18) (-0.63)
SIC scndry mnfctrng 0.210** 0.219** -0.049 0.009
(2.28) (2.27) (-0.44) (0.08)
SIC transp comm util -0.034 0.013 0.177* 0.122
(-0.36) (0.14) (1.83) (1.16)
SIC insurance realestate 0.077 0.042 0.061 0.021
(1.14) (0.61) (0.71) (0.26)
SIC business services 0.033 0.025 -0.013 -0.019
(0.60) (0.40) (-0.24) (-0.33)
ROA -0.037** -0.051*** -0.031** -0.024*
(-2.24) (-3.04) (-2.21) (-1.72)
Sales 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.032* 0.030*
(5.85) (5.76) (1.86) (1.80)
No. of employees 0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.012
(0.42) (-0.61) (-0.48) (-0.71)
Pe
rs
o
n
al

Ri
sk

Ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
Age of owner 0.041* 0.025 0.032 0.048**
(1.80) (1.17) (1.65) (2.32)
Female -0.028 0.046 -0.043 -0.028
(-0.57) (0.94) (-0.94) (-0.62)
Owner loan to firm 0.003 0.005 -0.034* -0.085***
(0.16) (0.33) (-1.82) (-4.31)
Home equity 0.003 -0.003 0.010* 0.006
(0.53) (-0.59) (1.94) (1.17)
Firm equity -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(-4.61) (-5.44) (-4.03) (-3.64)
Other net worth 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.36) (0.60) (0.75) (0.44)
Use computers 0.068 0.021 0.114** 0.114*
(0.64) (0.20) (2.02) (1.94)
Sophistication 0.043*** 0.027** 0.022* 0.014
(3.69) (2.41) (1.71) (1.10)
College degree 0.038 0.083* -0.100** -0.088*
(0.89) (1.95) (-2.26) (-1.90)
Graduate degree -0.078 -0.019 -0.047 -0.050
(-1.65) (-0.35) (-1.08) (-1.01)
Business exper. 0.020 0.034 0.059** 0.047*
(0.75) (1.35) (2.40) (1.84)
Constant 0.558*** 0.388*** 0.448*** 0.188 0.190*** 0.048
(5.28) (3.63) (2.99) (1.51) (3.44) (0.35)
Observations 258 258 258 278 278 278
Adj. R-squared 0.18 0.11 0.27 0.08 0.10 0.20
Explained variation by
personal risk characteristics 33.3% 60.0%
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